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ABSTRACT
This article critically evaluates existing causal explanations for the persis-
tence of informality in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). These expla-
nations share a legalistic focus on entry barriers and political impediments
that prevent or discourage the formalization of poverty-driven ASM opera-
tors: however, they fail to fully explain cases such as that of the Philippines,
where ASM is characterized by differentiation between a poverty-driven
workforce and a dominant stratumofASMentrepreneurs. Evenwhere limited
formalization frameworks provide ASM with a degree of legal recognition,
this recognition is usually restricted to these more powerful ASM interests,
while excluding the workforce at large. This article therefore proposes an
integrative approach to analysing informality in ASM, which complements
the existing legalistic focus on entry barriers with a structuralist concern over
the exploitation of informal labour. Seen from this perspective, the massive
expansion of ASM in the Philippines can be seen as the product of a tran-
sition away from capital-intensive large-scale mining to a flexible regime
of accumulation built around the exploitation of informal ASM labour. This
observation highlights the need to pay more critical attention to the eco-
nomic logic and the vested interests underlying the (selective) persistence of
informality in the workforce.
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) has witnessed a
spectacular growth worldwide, with current estimates putting the number of
those involved in what is normally defined as ‘labour-intensive, low-tech
mineral exploration and processing’ (Hilson, 2011: 1032) at 20–30 mil-
lion worldwide (Buxton, 2013). Notwithstanding efforts on the part of host
governments to regulate the sector, informality remains one of its defining
features (Siegel and Veiga, 2009). Most existing analyses of this persis-
tent informality focus on the fiscal, administrative and political barriers that
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prevent ‘poverty-driven’ (Hilson, 2010) ASM operators from obtaining ac-
cess tomineral-bearing land through existing formalization schemes (Hilson,
2013; Van Bockstael, 2014). However, these explanations fail to fully un-
derstand the situation in countries such as Tanzania (Fisher, 2007) and the
Philippines (Verbrugge, 2014), where ASM has reached a more advanced
stage, and is characterized by differentiation between a dominant stratum
of ASM entrepreneurs, and a massive workforce. While existing causal
explanations for the persistence of informality can explain the failure of
these entrepreneurs to secure formal access to mineral-bearing land through
official permits, they cannot account for the persistence of informality in em-
ployment arrangements and in the workforce at large, even in cases where a
permit has been issued.
In an effort to remedy this important shortcoming, and to develop a more
comprehensive understanding of the diverse causes and consequences of
informality for the different (categories of) actors involved in the sector, this
article proposes an integrative approach for analysing informality (Chen,
2008) in ASM. This integrative approach bridges the divide between the
existing ASM literature and structuralist informalization approaches, which
treat the massive expansion of informal sector activity as an intricate product
of economic crisis and restructuring. More precisely, dwindling opportuni-
ties for accumulation in the formal economy have induced a massive shift
towards strategies of accumulation that rely on the exploitation of cheap
informal labour (Portes et al., 1989; Tabak and Crichlow, 2000).
The added value of this integrative approach is then illustrated by apply-
ing it to the predominantly informal ASM sector in Compostela Valley, in
the southern Philippines. Here, even in cases where ASM operates inside a
designated permit area, the workforce remains without formal legal recog-
nition. An historical analysis of shifting strategies of accumulation in the
mining sector reveals that, following a profound crisis in capital-intensive
large-scale mining, a transition occurred to more flexible ASM, in which
accumulation revolves around the exploitation of a massive informal labour
force. In short, while informality is partly a product of entry barriers and
political impediments that exclude ASM from the formal economy, the per-
sistence of informality in labour arrangements is also amatter of exploitation,
and serves the interests of a dominant stratum of ASM entrepreneurs.
Carrying out research on ASM is a challenging affair due to a range
of sector-specific characteristics, including variable income and production
levels and a high degree of mobility (Heemskerk, 2005). In this case, the
political context also presented particular challenges. Apart from the fact that
their ‘illegality’ makes ASM operators wary of outside inquiry, Compostela
Valley province is also home to different armed actors that are to varying
degrees involved in ASM. Further compounding these challenges is the
almost complete absence of data on Philippine mining in the 1980s and
1990s. To overcome these methodological challenges, I relied on a range of
qualitative research methods that allowed me to work my way around thorny
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political issues, and to establish relationships of trust with respondents. This
article draws on approximately seven months of field research and more
than 200 open-ended interviews with a broad range of respondents, with a
prime focus on upland settlers, ASM labourers and financiers. Life-course
methodologies that ‘give value to the subjective life account as revealing of
wider institutional changes’ (Locke and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2011: 1132) were
particularly helpful. Analysing and combining concise life narratives with
scant existing evidence on trends in the Philippine mining sector allowed me
to reconstruct historical-institutional trajectories and shifts in the underlying
structure of accumulation.
COMPETING THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INFORMAL SECTOR
ACTIVITY1
Entry, Exit and Exclusion as Dominant Causal Explanations
Insofar as the informal sector received academic attention before the 1970s,
it was typically approached from a modernist viewpoint, as a remnant of
traditional societies bound to disappear with economic progress (Tabak and
Crichlow, 2000). The continued expansion of the informal sector in sub-
sequent decades, both in developing and in developed countries, attracted
growing scholarly attention. Initial explanations for this continued expan-
sion of informal sector activity were steeped in a pervasive dualism, which
assumes a strict dichotomy between the formal and the informal realms of the
economy. One influential approach, closely associated with the International
Labour Organization (ILO), saw the informal sector as a marginal economy
populated by petty entrepreneurs (ILO, 1972). These dualist approaches see
informal sector growth as ‘counter-cyclical’: expanding in times of crisis,
and contracting in times of growth.
With the ascendance of neoliberal development paradigms a more opti-
mistic, legalist approach to informality emerged. Closely associated with
the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (2000), this approach
views the informal sector as a reservoir of ‘plucky micro-entrepreneurs’
(Chen, 2008: 22) who lack formal property rights because of various fiscal-
regulatory barriers that prevent their entry into a formal sector dominated by
a ‘mercantilist’ elite which deliberately excludes them (de Soto, 1989).
These observations provided legitimation for minimalistic formalization
programmes which focus on the registration of (previously unregistered)
property rights. In recent years a related voluntarist approach has gained
popularity. While also paying attention to fiscal and regulatory barriers in
1. This section draws on Chen (2008), who provides an excellent overview of different theo-
retical approaches to the informal sector.
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the formal economy, the focus lies on how these provide rational economic
actors with incentives to exit the formal economy (Maloney, 2004).
While these leading approaches to informal sector activity continue to res-
onate widely, they were also criticized on a number of counts. By depicting
the informal sector as a homogeneous group of self-employed individuals,
they fail to recognize the heterogeneous and segmented character of in-
formal sector activity (Biles, 2009). Furthermore, the dualist assumptions
underpinning these approaches preclude a fuller understanding of how the
informal sector is entangled with the formal sector, and how the expansion
of informal sector activity is embedded in the ‘longue dure´e’ of capitalism
(Tabak and Crichlow, 2000).
Structuralist Informalization Perspectives and the Exploitation of Informal
Labour
Engaging with these criticisms are neo-Marxist, structuralist approaches to
informal sector activity, closely associatedwith thework of Alejandro Portes
(Portes and Schauffler, 1993; Portes et al., 1989). Structuralist approaches
do not study the informal sector as a distinct set of economic activities, but
instead draw attention to informalization as a long-term systemic process
embedded in the ebbs and flows of global capitalism (Tabak and Crichlow,
2000). The expansion of informal sector activity in recent decades is not
simply seen as a bottom-up reaction to economic crisis or over-regulation,
but as a capitalist response to a crisis of accumulation in the formal econ-
omy: to counter declining profit rates and avoid ‘the costs of social security
obligations and other substantial overhead costs of formal sector operation’
(Meagher, 1995: 260), employers have increasingly resorted to the exploita-
tion of a cheap informal labour reserve.
Analytically, structuralist approaches focus on three distinct features of
informal sector activity (slightly adapted from Meagher, 1995). First, they
aim to understand the heterogeneous and segmented character of informal
sector activity. Portes and Schauffler (1993) distinguish between subsis-
tence, autonomous and subordinate informal sector activity. While the first
two categories form the domains of dualist and legalist approaches, respec-
tively, the third category involves those activities linked with production and
consumption in the formal economy, and forms the focal point of structural-
ist approaches. Similarly, Harriss-White (2010: 171) distinguishes between
small-scale informal activity (i.e. those activities with minimal entry bar-
riers and ‘below size thresholds for taxation and labor regulation’) and
interstitial informal activity, which takes place ‘in and around registered
or formal businesses or state bureaucracies’. In reality, of course, informal
sector work is characterized by complex employment arrangements that cut
across these categories (Biles, 2009). Nonetheless, for analytical purposes it
is still helpful to distinguish between informal self-employment (including
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both informal own-account workers and informal employees) and informal
wage employment (Chen, 2008).
Second, attention is drawn to the intricate connections between the formal
and the informal economy. The defining logic of these connections is the
exploitation of informal labour by formal sector interests. This exploitation
can occur directly, with companies hiring workers ‘off the books’, or in-
directly, through outsourcing and subcontracting as ‘the primary means of
linking the formal and the informal economy’ (Biles, 2009: 224). Attention
has also been drawn to the role of middlemen who recruit and discipline
informal labour, and act as ‘the link between providers of capital in the form
of raw materials or semi-products’ and ‘workers whose labour adds value to
them’ (Breman, 1999: 455).
A third focal point is the enabling role of state institutions and social net-
works in processes of informalization.2 Although many states simply lack
the capacity to regulate the informal economy, ‘the expansion of informality
since the 1970s . . . demands the complicity of the state’ (Meagher, 1995:
265). For one, ‘ambiguous and inconsistent policy, and policy that is difficult
to enforce, represent an implicit encouragement of informalization’ (ibid.:
277; see also Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia, 1989). The enabling role of the
state in the informalization of the economy was — somewhat paradoxically
— further galvanized by structural adjustment, which supported a ‘deinsti-
tutionalization and decentralization of the economy’ (Meagher, 1995: 278).
Finally, state actors may be politically inclined to condone or even support
informal sector activity, because it provides the population with valuable
opportunities for survival and accumulation, thereby contributing to so-
ciopolitical stability (Rubbers, 2007). Where social networks are concerned,
for our purposes it is particularly important to understand their role as orga-
nizational structures that connect ‘the employer to a supply of “trustworthy”
labour’ (Weiss, 1987: 229).
Towards an Integrative Approach
While these different approaches to informal sector activity clearly have
explanatory power in the face of persistent informality, each of them offers
only a partial causal explanation in the context of a particular segment of
the informal economy (Chen, 2008). Whereas legalist and voluntarist ap-
proaches are clearly more relevant in the case of the informal self-employed,
persistent informality in the workforce usually stems from a combination
of exclusion (from existing regulatory frameworks) and exploitation, and is
better understood through a structuralist lens.
2. While Meagher (1995) discusses the role of the state and social networks separately, for
analytical purposes I have opted to discuss them together.
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What is needed, then, is an integrative approach for analysing infor-
mality, which couples a nuanced understanding of the structural charac-
teristics of the informal economy with an analysis of different forms of
informality, combining causal explanations that focus on entry, exit and
exclusion as well as exploitation (Chen, 2008). In a similar vein, Biles pro-
poses studying the informal sector through the holistic concept of regulation,
which pays attention not just to ‘the legal status of the activity’ but also to
‘the relationship between employer and employee (access to social protec-
tions and benefits such as health care and pensions), and conditions within
the workplace (e.g. working conditions, hours, and wages)’ (Biles, 2009:
216).
THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE PERSISTENCE OF
INFORMALITY IN ASM
Informality: A Question of Entry, Exit and Exclusion?
Critical ASM observers have long been preoccupied with disproving images
of a sector composed of opportunist fortune-seekers. An academic consensus
has emerged that attributes ASM expansion to a pervasive subsistence crisis,
caused by interrelated processes of structural adjustment, de-agrarianization
(e.g. Banchirigah, 2007; Hilson, 2010; Hilson and Garforth, 2012), and in
some cases even armed conflict (Hilson and Van Bockstael, 2011). This
poverty-driven view of ASM as a survival activity whose ‘low barriers
to entry mean that smallholders only require a pick and shovel to start
working’ (Kamlongera, 2011: 1131) is surprisingly akin to earlier dualist
understandings of the informal sector which treat it as a marginal subsistence
economy.
The idea that these poverty-driven ASM operators require enforceable
property rights is now well established in policy circles, and many coun-
tries have set up permit and licensing schemes (Siegel and Veiga, 2009).
However, these efforts to formalize ASM have largely failed. Causal ex-
planations for the persistence of informality are in line with dominant
legalist — and to a lesser extent voluntarist — approaches to informal sector
activity, and focus on identifying the fiscal-administrative barriers and politi-
cal impediments that prevent and/or discourage formalization (Hilson, 2013;
Maconachie and Hilson, 2011; Tschakert and Singha, 2007; Van Bockstael,
2014). The prevailing sentiment in many countries is nicely captured by
Banchirigah’s observations about Ghana: ‘Although the government has
long legalised ASM, requiring prospective applicants to follow a series of
streamlined regulations to obtain a concession, ineffective policies and bu-
reaucratic inefficiency have impeded formalisation, making illegal activity
more appealing’ (Banchirigah, 2008: 29).
With regard to political obstacles, important questions have been raised
over elite capture of the formalization process. In Tanzania, for example,
Persistent Informality: ASM in the Southern Philippines 1029
formal licences accrue primarily to those actors with the necessary procedu-
ral knowledge and political connections. Anothermajor reason for the persis-
tence of informality in many countries is government support for large-scale
mining (Banchirigah, 2007; Hilson and Potter, 2005). In several of these
countries, ASM formalization was a ‘legislative afterthought’, introduced
after mining companies had monopolized access to mineral-bearing land
(Banchirigah and Hilson, 2009). Hilson even sees informality as ‘an inten-
tional construct on the part of policymakers and donors’ (Hilson, 2013: 56),
who prioritize large-scale mining over ASM, while ‘making it extremely
difficult for individuals to secure the necessary paperwork and licenses to
participate in the latter’ (ibid.: 54).
Others have noted that some ASM operators may not necessarily be inter-
ested in acquiring a formal licence (Geenen, 2012), and may well be satisfied
with access that is negotiated informally (Van Bockstael, 2014). Meanwhile
Cartier and Bu¨rge (2011: 1089) suggest that ‘Operating without a license
offers many gold miners greater mobility and flexibility in their search for
commercially viable gold deposits and also suits more rudimentary, tempo-
rary and seasonal mining activities’.
The Role of Differentiation and Exploitation
Causal explanations for the persistence of informality in ASM that focus on
entry, exit and exclusion resonate widely, giving rise to policy recommenda-
tions that focus on ‘democratizing’ registration procedures and segregating
mineral-bearing land for ASM (Hilson, 2013). However, based on the criti-
cal overview of theoretical approaches to informal sector activity provided
above, several shortcomings can be identified. These shortcomings essen-
tially stem from rather simplistic images of a dual mining economy that
is assumed to be bifurcated between formal, capital-intensive large-scale
mining and informal, poverty-driven and rudimentary ASM (for a recent
example see Canavesio, 2014). While these images may well capture the
situation in some countries, overly simplistic dualistic assumptions bar us
from fully appreciating the complexity of ASM and the reasons fuelling its
persistent informality.
Images of an exclusively informal ASM segment do not always corre-
spond to realities on the ground. Instead, in countries with a long-standing
tradition of ASM regulation, such as Ghana and Tanzania, the sector has
‘evolved into a highly intertwined group of semi-formal sectors operating
with varying degrees of legal registrations’ (Teschner, 2012: 308). Further-
more, as Chachage (1995) has demonstrated for Tanzania, there has been
a long history of interaction between large-scale mining and ASM, with
the latter usually in a subordinate position. Arguably more problematic is
that explanations which treat ASM as a poverty-driven subsistence sector
often fail to account for its heterogeneous and segmented character. In recent
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years, our understanding of the different working practices, employment ar-
rangements and organizational practices in ASM has improved immensely
(e.g. Cartier and Bu¨rge, 2011; Jønsson and Fold, 2009). Furthermore, re-
search in countries as diverse as Tanzania (Fisher, 2007), Guyana (Clifford,
2011) and the Philippines (Verbrugge, 2014) has revealed a central role for
external financiers. The injection of outside capital has led to a growing
differentiation among ASM operations in terms of their level of capital-
ization and professionalization, but also between a nascent group of ASM
entrepreneurs and a poverty-driven workforce. In general, attempts to ex-
plain persistent informality in ASM remain disconnected from these more
nuanced understandings of the structural characteristics of the sector. A no-
table exception is Fisher, who couples a discussion of formalization efforts
in Tanzania with an empirical analysis of working and sharing arrangements
in ASM. In doing so, she argues that while formalization efforts benefit
‘certain wealthier categories of people, who fit into the model of an “en-
trepreneurial small-scale miner”’ (Fisher, 2007: 735), they simultaneously
neglect existing employment arrangements, thereby reinforcing rather than
mitigating existing practices of exclusion and exploitation.
Using an Integrative Approach for Analysing Informality in ASM
In short, existing analyses of persistent informality in ASM are strongly
influenced by dualist, legalist and (to a lesser extent) voluntarist approaches
to informal sector activity. What is largely lacking in the ASM literature is
an engagement with structuralist concerns over the exploitation of informal
labour, and its role in broader structures of accumulation. There is an urgent
need for an integrative approach for analysing informality in ASM, which
complements more ‘mainstream’ concerns over entry, exit and exclusion,
with a critical structuralist concern over exploitation. Such a structuralist
lens obliges us to look at (1) historical processes of differentiation in the
ASM sector; (2) possible (historical) linkages between ASM and large-scale
mining; and (3) the role of state actors and social networks in the recruitment
and possibly the exploitation of informal labour. In the remainder of this
article, the added value of such an integrative approach will be illustrated
on the basis of empirical evidence from Compostela Valley province, the
self-proclaimed ‘gold mining capital of the Philippines’.
THE PERSISTENCE OF INFORMALITY IN ASM: THE CASE OF
COMPOSTELA VALLEY
Since the 1980s ASM has undergone a dramatic expansion in the Philip-
pines, particularly but not exclusively in the form of small-scale gold mining
(Verbrugge, 2014). Recent estimates put the number involved in the sector
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between 125,000 and 500,000 nationwide.3 Despite this expansion, ASM
continues to escape broad public and academic attention. When it is dis-
cussed, simplistic dualist images prevail whereby ‘small-scale mining prac-
ticed largely bymarginalized local communities who employ labor-intensive
traditional technology’ is seen to exist alongside ‘large-scale mining which
is undertaken by large local and foreign corporations that employ sophis-
ticated technology’ (Gomez, 2010: 8). Only recently has an attempt been
made to qualify this simplistic image of ASM as a poverty-driven sector,
with Verbrugge (2014) arguing that outside financiers motivated by a desire
to accumulate have pushed ASM well beyond subsistence level.
Successive governments have undertaken efforts to extend the state’s
regulatory control over ASM.4 In 1984 President Marcos created a highly
permissive permit system for ASM through Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1899. In 1991, Republic Act (RA) No. 7076 (the ‘People’s Small-Scale
Mining Act’) put in place more stringent requirements for ASM, creating
provincial/city mining regulatory boards authorized to segregate ‘people’s
small-scale mining areas’ (Minahang Bayan) wherein two-year renewable
contracts may be awarded to ASM cooperatives registered with the securi-
ties and exchange commission and the cooperative development authority.
Both PD 1899 and RA 7076 define small-scale mining as ‘artisanal with
heavy reliance on manual labor and without the use of explosives and/or
blasting accessories . . . [and] prohibited from using sophisticated and/or
heavy equipment, i.e. excavators, loaders, backhoes, dozers, drilling ma-
chines and/or related or similar equipment for the extraction and/or break-
age of materials’.5 Several other administrative and executive orders further
specified and tightened existing regulations, particularly in the domains of
land use, safety and the environment.
Despite these different regulatory initiatives, an estimated 80 per cent of
ASM continues to operate without the necessary permits (Galvez, 2012).
Furthermore, while the central bank retains a formal monopoly on gold
buying, after reaching an all-time high of 42.9 billion Philippine Pesos
(around US$ 1 billion) in 2010, official gold sales plummeted, and there has
been a massive increase in gold smuggling (Francisco, 2012). This section
aims to provide an explanation for persistent informality in the sector, based
on the integrative approach proposed in the previous section. For the sake
of analytical clarity, this explanation will be structured along the lines of the
3. While the exact number of ASM participants in the country is subject to a high degree
of speculation, this figure was mentioned in the inaugural speech of Ateneo de Davao
president Joel Tabora (who consulted various experts participating in the conference) at a
2012 conference on ASM hosted by Ateneo de Davao University.
4. For relevant laws and regulations, see the website of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau:
www.mgb.gov.ph
5. ‘Clarificatory guidelines in the implementation of the small-scale mining laws’, DENR
Memorandum Circular No. 2007-07: http://mgb.gov.ph/Files/Policies/dmc-2007-07.pdf.
(accessed 8 April 2014).
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four major causal explanations for informality as identified by Chen (2008),
namely entry, exit, exclusion and, last but not least, exploitation.
Looking for Viable Explanations for Persistent Informality
At least in part, informality is a matter of a lack of state capacity, with numer-
ous state officials complaining that limited human and financial resources
prevent them from monitoring ASM, which often takes place in remote
areas. The situation in Compostela Valley is exacerbated by the transient
nature of ASM — which is often described as a ‘hit-and-run’ activity —
and the presence of different armed groups, some of which (particularly the
communist New People’s Army) are hostile towards (national) government
actors.
While the lack of state capacity offers opportunities to evade government
supervision, ASM operators also have clear incentives to do so. Govern-
ment officials have repeatedly suggested that ‘exit’ is indeed a viable causal
explanation for the lack of official permits: ‘We are waiting for them, they
should join forces, form a cooperative, and apply for a permit. Then they
should come to our office and comply with the registration procedures. But
they do not respond, it seems that they are not interested in being regulated’.6
ASM operators would indeed have a problem if they had to comply with the
strict mine safety rules and regulations provided by Administrative Order
97-30, or the ban on mercury use — still a widely used method for gold
extraction — introduced by Executive Order 79. Furthermore, the dramatic
rise in illegal gold trading since 2011 is clearly the result of the imposition
of a 2 per cent excise tax and a 5 per cent withholding tax on gold sales
(Francisco, 2012).
While ASM operators thus have clear incentives to evade government
regulation, most still expressed the sincere hope of obtaining a permit. How-
ever, a range of fiscal and administrative barriers prevent most of them
from actually doing so. Applicants need to comply with a seemingly endless
list of requirements in order to qualify for a permit or contract, including
notarized application forms, survey plans prepared by a land surveyor, a
surety bond, a technical evaluation report from the Mines and Geosciences
Board (MGB), Environmental Compliance Certificates from the Depart-
ment of Environment and Natural Resources, business permits and zoning
certifications issued by local governments, a mining plan prepared by an
engineer, and proof of financial and technical capability issued by a finan-
cial institution.7 These different administrative requirements carry signifi-
cant costs in the form of filing, processing, clearance and registration fees.
These costs are further inflated by pervasive rent-seeking, with respondents
6. Interview with provincial government official, Nabunturan, October 2012.
7. This list was provided by the Provincial Agriculturalist Office.
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admitting to having paid ‘standard operating procedures’ or ‘under the table’
payments to smooth the permit (renewal) process. Respondents from differ-
ent provinces mentioned permit costs ranging from P 100,000 to 300,000
(US$ 2,500–7,500) — an amount that most ASM operators could never
afford.
In addition to these entry barriers, various political impediments conspire
to excludeASMoperators from the formal economy. In addition to pervasive
rent-seeking on the part of state officials, the allocation of permits is also
plagued by nepotism and patronage. It is crucial for ASM operators to have
connections at the level of the provincial governor, who retains a high degree
of control over the allocation of permits through the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board. Ultimately, this gives rise to the paradoxical situation
whereby those who are able to comply with the permit process no longer
qualify as small-scale miners according to existing legal definitions.
Another key requirement for ASM operators to qualify for a permit is
the consent of existing surface and/or mineral rights holders. In some cases
land and associated royalty rights are claimed by a tribal community under
the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997. Furthermore, and in line with
the situation in countries such as Ghana (Hilson, 2013), the national gov-
ernment seems to be prioritizing large-scale mining over ASM, awarding
increasingly large tracts of mineral-bearing land to large mining companies,
who are reluctant to (legally) condone the presence of ASM inside their
concession. At the same time, increasingly large tracts of land have been
declared protected areas by the national government, which makes them off
bounds for mining.
Most analyses end here, providing causal explanations that focus on en-
try, exit and/or exclusion. However, such explanations cannot fully account
for the situation in places like Compostela Valley where, despite a clear
stipulation in RA 7076 that ‘All persons undertaking small-scale mining
activities shall register as miners . . . and may organize themselves into
cooperatives in order to qualify for the awarding of a people’s small-scale
mining contract’, the workforce remains excluded from existing formal-
ization efforts. Even where a cooperative has been issued with a con-
tract, its membership is often restricted to financiers and royalty-receiving
landowners.
In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming, we now turn to a histori-
cal, structuralist analysis of ASM in Compostela Valley, paying particular
analytical attention to processes of differentiation, to historical linkages be-
tween ASM and large-scale mining, and to the role of state actors and social
networks in the informal mining sector. The central argument is that the
massive expansion of (predominantly) informal ASM in Compostela Valley
can be seen as a process of informalization in the mining sector, epitomized
by a transition from capital-intensive large-scale mining to a more flexi-
ble regime of accumulation built around ASM and the exploitation of its
informal workforce.
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Boom–Bust Cycles in Philippine Mining
While the Philippines has a long history of artisanal gold mining (Caballero,
1992), during American colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century
the country saw the emergence of a modern mining sector (Habana, 2008).
In 1936, Commonwealth Act 137 put in place a mineral tenure system that
enabled the government, as the exclusive owner ofmineral resources, to grant
private large-scale mining concessions (Lopez, 1992). While the nascent
corporate mining sector displaced and/or absorbed many of the artisanal
miners as unskilled wage labour, it did not destroy ASM altogether. Instead,
cursory evidence suggests that the expansion of large-scale mining gave
further impetus to ASM, as the ‘exposure of deeper lode veins made by
the big mines made readily available more mining holes and enriched the
panning streams to these small mines’ (Habana, 2008: 37). Power relations
soon tilted in favour of the mining companies, who became ‘the main gold
buyers, principal employers, and sources of credit and patronage’ (ibid.:
33). However, the corporate mining boom came to a grinding halt with the
outbreak of the Second World War.
In the decades after the war, metal mining expanded dramatically, and
the 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of ‘mining giants’ like Philex and
Atlas, which startedmining projects throughout the country (Ofreneo, 2009).
Under the impetus of rising gold prices, the 1970s became ‘undoubtedly the
busiest for the mining industry as a whole. Old, dormant gold mines were
reopened, new gold mines developed, existing copper mines expanded, and
new copper projects undertaken’ (Lopez, 1992: 264). While respondents
indicated that these mining companies also employed cheap, unskilled local
labour, particularly for infrastructure development, they ultimately relied
on capital-intensive mining methods and skilled mining labour, which was
reportedly among the best paid in the country.
By the 1980s a combination of factors triggered a major crisis in the min-
ing sector. The global oil crisis of the 1970s–80s and the associated drop
in mineral prices rendered capital-intensive large-scale mining increasingly
unprofitable (Lopez, 1992; Ofreneo, 2009; Santos, 2001). A severe debt
crisis led to rising pressures on the Marcos regime, with civil unrest and
armed insurgency on the rise, particularly on the southern island of Min-
danao (Abinales, 2000). Creditors lost faith in the Philippines, leading to
unprecedented levels of capital flight (Hutchcroft, 1991). Faced with these
uncertain prospects, President Marcos and his entourage were increasingly
preoccupied with enriching themselves through ‘Crony business failures as-
sociated with an unstable environment which discouraged long-term local
investment in favor of short-term gains’ (Pinches, 1996: 112).
In 1974 President Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree 462, which
sought to get rid of neocolonial ties with the USA by putting a 40 per cent
constitutional bar on foreign ownership. However, it also led to a sudden
retreat of foreign financial and human capital from the mining sector (Lopez,
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1992). The subsequent ‘Filipinization’ of the mining sector coincided with a
proliferation of ‘one-of-a-kind arrangements and special deals’ (Clad, 1988:
76), whereby the Marcos government granted loan guarantees to selected
local mining projects, many of which later defaulted on their debt obligations
(Santos, 2001). In 1981 the government suddenly raised mining taxes, re-
vealing yet again the regulatory volatility in the mining sector (Lopez, 1992;
Santos, 2001). In this context, an increasing number of mining companies
fell prey to corruption, mismanagement and rising production costs.
The post-war mining sector of Compostela Valley8 provides a good il-
lustration of these trends. From the 1950s onwards, Compostela Valley
witnessed the entry of several big copper mining projects. After reaching
their apex in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, these projects were
negatively affected by the interplay between fledgling mineral markets and
corporate mismanagement. The workforce bore the brunt of the crisis: ‘The
crippling price crisis in the metals market and the recession-depression in
the Philippines in the first half of the 1980s forced many mining compa-
nies to institute all kinds of cost-saving measures, including ways to reduce
labour costs’ (Lopez, 1992: 376). Increased social unrest further speeded the
process of decay. APEX mining, still the biggest mining project of Com-
postela Valley, is a good example. Starting out as a copper mining project in
the early 1970s, APEX pursued an aggressive expansion of its gold mining
operations in response to rising gold prices in the 1980s. However, the com-
pany’s operations quicklywent into decline, and by themid-1980s theAPEX
concession was effectively controlled by a small group of company guards
and engineers who were increasingly reneging on their responsibilities vis-
a`-vis the workforce, which ‘received no more salaries, had no cooperative,
no canteen and no more supplies’.9 This cleared the way for militant labour
activism, spearheaded by the Southern Philippines Federation of Labour
(SPFL), which eventually culminated in a general strike in the late 1980s.
While the engineers managed to temporarily stave off the labour shortage
by hiring short-term contractual labour, by 1991 APEX, like nearby North
Davao mining and SABENA mines, was forced to close its operations.
From Corporate Mining, through Subordinate ASM, to Autonomous ASM
Worsening conditions in large-scale mining led to an exodus of (semi-)
skilled workers, many of whom became involved in rudimentary tunnelling
activities that targeted surface gold veins. Up to this point the narrative
still conforms to existing accounts of ASM expansion in countries such
as Ghana (Hilson, 2010) and the DRC (Geenen, 2011), where former
8. Prior to 1998, when Compostela Valley became a separate province, it was part of Davao
del Norte.
9. Interview with former APEX employees, Maawab, January 2014.
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large-scale mining labour played an important role in ‘kick-starting’ ASM.
In the Philippines, however, the transition to ASM was not confined to the
‘rank and file’. Instead, upon realizing their dwindling prospects in large-
scalemining, a number of those involved in the higher echelons of themining
companies also shifted their attention to ASM, and came to play a vital role
in the sector’s subsequent maturation.
By the early 1980s, the APEX management — or what remained of it —
had responded to the expansion of ASM by initiating an ‘outside project’,
which consisted of buying ores and ball mill tailings fromASM, and process-
ing them inside the APEX compound.10 In return, ASM operators received a
per ton lump sum, based on assay (mineral content) readings provided by the
APEX management. While the compensation was not necessarily deemed
fair by the miners in question, respondents nonetheless suggested that this
additional source of income ‘inspired us to dig more ore’.11 Thus, instead
of being merely a subsistence response to economic crisis on the part of a
destitute workforce, the shift to ASM was actively supported by corporate
mining interests.
From the mid-1980s onwards, ASM would gradually ‘emancipate’ itself
from corporate mining, as epitomized by the end of APEX’s outside project
in the late 1980s. Some of the engineers and chemists previously employed
in APEX and nearby North Davao mining had decided to pool their skills
and resources to set up their own corporation, Value Minerals (VMI). While
VMI also financed its own tunnels, its main activity consisted of buying and
processing ores and ball mill tailings from other ASM operators. For this
purpose VMI established the first carbon-in-pulp (CIP) processing12 plant
in Compostela Valley (and most likely in the Philippines as a whole) that
was not owned by large-scale mining13. This led to a gradual democratiza-
tion and diffusion of CIP processing throughout Compostela Valley, which
dramatically increased the profitability and feasibility of ASM.
By the early 1990s the transition to ASM had even taken place inside the
large-scale mining concessions. Following APEX’s closure in 1991, many
of its former workers left for one of the numerous gold rush areas in the
region, but others became engaged in ASM inside the company premises.
Rather than a spontaneous effort on the part of a destitute workforce, this
shift was orchestrated by the remaining APEX engineers. Under the new
set-up, they provided the workforce with materials (‘sacks, picks, hammers,
timber and nails’14) to maintain the tunnels, while retaining as much as
60 per cent of the ores. The remaining 40 per cent accrued to the workforce,
10. This was confirmed by several respondents, but see also Lopez (1992).
11. Interview with small-scale miner, Maco, February 2014.
12. CIP processing is a gold recovery technique whereby high-grade gold ores are dissolved in
a limestone-cyanide slurry. Carbon is then introduced to ‘capture’ the gold particles, and
this ‘impregnated’ carbon is then ‘cooked’ to recover the gold.
13. Several interviews were conducted with VMI employees in January–February 2014.
14. Focus group discussion with former APEX employees, Maco, February 2014.
Persistent Informality: ASM in the Southern Philippines 1037
although former workers recalled a company guard by the name of Chavez
— known for ‘his big hands he used to slap you with’15 — who played a
key role in overseeing the operations, and who took an additional cut of the
workers’ share. This manual mining episode lasted for roughly three or four
years, after which APEX allegedly — the MGB claims to have no written
records on this period — started sub-contracting its claim and infrastructure
to outside investors.
In nearby New Bataan, a similar combination of labour activism, com-
pany mismanagement, and decreasing copper prices led to the bankruptcy
and subsequent nationalization of SABENA mines in the early 1980s (San-
tos, 2001). At around the same time, part of SABENA’s mining concession
witnessed the emergence of gold mining activities that were described by
one respondent as ‘not large-scale, but also not really small-scale, they used
blasting and a backhoe . . . there was manual labour inside the tunnel’.16 Ac-
cording to several respondents, company guards were involved in organizing
these tunnelling activities, and some even claimed that ‘the management had
a helicopter just to take away the gold’.17 While the labour force worked
under a revenue-sharing arrangement, remunerations were irregular, and as
a result many of the workers started ‘going solo’. The end of this ‘illegal
gold mining project’ coincided roughly with the end of martial law in the
mid-1980s, and only several years later did VMI start tunnelling the area
anew (as mentioned above).
The initial expansion of ASM in the 1980s and early 1990s can thus be
understood as the product of a profound crisis in large-scale mining, with
many of those previously involved shifting their resources and energies to
ASM. This included labourers looking for ways to compensate for their
lost income, but also company cadres and skilled personnel who wanted to
capitalize on shifting opportunities for accumulation. To fully understand the
rationale underlying this transition from capital-intensive large-scale mining
to labour-intensive ASM, we now turn to an (admittedly initial) empirical
analysis of the social relations of production in ASM, which reveals that
accumulation rests on the exploitation of informal labour.
Differentiation and Accumulation through Exploitation
Initially, ASM was a small-scale, self-financed affair, with miners and sur-
face landowners each retaining equal shares of the ores. However, the in-
creased involvement of outside financiers and skilled experts enabled the
capitalization and professionalization of ASM (Verbrugge, 2014). This
in turn led to increased differentiation, both between artisanal and more
15. Focus group discussion with former APEX employees, Maco, February 2014.
16. Interview with former SABENA miner, New Bataan, February 2014.
17. Interview with former SABENA miner, New Bataan, February 2014.
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capitalized, ‘medium-scale’ — as respondents themselves referred to
them — tunnelling operations, and between a dominant stratum of ASM
entrepreneurs and a massive workforce that was now subjected to rising
rates of exploitation. ‘Exploitation’ is understood here in the classic Marx-
ist sense as ‘the existence of a “surplus value” remaining when the value
of a worker’s wage and the value of the means of production consumed
by a worker are subtracted from the value of a worker’s produce. The rate
of exploitation is the ratio of this surplus value to the value of the wage’
(Burawoy, 1976: 1056).
In the first instance, the financier advances the operational expenses for
the mining operations. These include the price for mining tools, sacks, a
generator, a water pump and timber reinforcements. Some financiers also
provide the workforce with food and shelter, and in some cases even with
cash advances. Depending on the size of the operations, they also hire un-
skilled hauling, packing and processing labour and/or (semi-)skilled workers
such as carpenters, electricians and sometimes even chemists and engineers.
While the former are usually hired on a casual basis and receive low piece-
rate wages (e.g. per bag, per sack), the latter earn fairly decent wages and
have longer-term job security. In addition to these operational expenses, and
depending on the area in question, there is also a range of rent-seekers that
ask the financier for a share of the revenues. The (often informal) surface
land claimants usually receive a 10–15 per cent royalty share. Local politi-
cians ask for a range of fees or ‘privileges’. In many cases, there is a tribal
association claiming land and royalty rights under the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA). Inside a Minahang Bayan, the rights-wielding coopera-
tive will also ask for a royalty. Finally, Compostela Valley is home to a range
of armed rent-seekers including the police (who also supply explosives), the
army, and communist and Muslim rebels. These operational expenses and
rent-seeking efforts are deducted from the gross revenues, and put serious
downward pressures on the net revenues that are redistributed between the
financier and the workforce.
The financier’s cut of these net revenues ranges from one share (with
the number of shares depending on the number of workers) to 70 per cent.
However, 40:60 and 60:40 (per cent) are common schemes for revenue dis-
tribution between the financier and the workforce. This workforce is invari-
ably organized into corpos, groups of miners operating a particular tunnel,
and headed by a team leader. Whereas corpo members supposedly retain
one share each, it is not uncommon for the team leader or selected corpo
members to receive a bonus from the financier. The situation becomes more
complicated in bigger tunnel complexes, where a tunnel portal branches out
into numerous destinos. While the main tunnel and some destinos are main-
tained and financed by the management, other destinos have independent
financiers. In the latter case, there is a multi-tiered system of benefit-sharing,
whereby the management will retain 40 to 60 per cent of the destino’s
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revenues, while the rest is shared between the financier and the corpo of the
destino in question.
Similar sharing schemes have been described elsewhere in positive terms
(Godoy, 1988), and they are indeed characterized by a significant degree of
mutuality: while financiers shift part of the risk to the workforce, the latter
retains a chance to strike it rich and is in many cases guaranteed subsistence
by the financier in the form of basic food provisions, shelter and sometimes
even cash advances. However, these provisions (like various other inputs)
often come from the financiers’ own hardware store, warehouse, or gasoline
station, and it is well known that financiers mark up the price of these
inputs. More importantly, many financiers now own their own processing
facilities, either in the form of a ball mill or a more sophisticated CIP plant,
where recovery rates (according to local respondents) are two or three times
higher than those of a ball mill. In cases where workers are paid in kind,
they will process their ore share in a local ball mill, leaving the tailings
for the owner who will then process these tailings in a plant for a custom
milling fee (usually around P 80,000 or US$ 2,000 for 20 tons). Increasingly,
however, financiers are processing the ores directly in their own CIP plant
(or that of one of their associates), paying the workers a cash share and
deducting the costs for ore transport and processing as part of the operational
expenses. At least intuitively, the higher recovery rate of CIP processing
should lead to a higher share for the workers. However, the sheer complexity
of CIP processingmakes it difficult for workers tomonitor production levels,
and easier for financiers to cheat on the workforce. CIP processing also
enables the extraction of silver, the revenues of which are rarely (if ever)
included in the revenue sharing. Ultimately, ASM in Compostela Valley is
now characterized by high degrees of capital concentration, with financiers
and processing plant owners — following the initial example of VMI —
coalescing into cartel-like structures. Wherever a promising tunnel prospect
arises, these ‘corporations’ will come in and buy out (by including them in
the management), compete with, or even drive out existing operators.
Based on these initial observations, it is clear that the distribution of
benefits in the sector favours a dominant stratum of ASM entrepreneurs,
a range of (armed) rent-seekers, and to a lesser extent those commanding
vital skills and experience. Meanwhile the lion’s share of the workforce,
while depending on ASM for subsistence, is falling prey to high rates of ex-
ploitation. It should therefore not come as a surprise that several respondents
expressed a clear preference for smaller, self-financed operations, because in
their experience financiers will simply exploit the workforce. These obser-
vations about exploitation become more vivid when considering the dismal
working and living conditions in ASM. Miners work long hours inside
narrow and extremely hot tunnels, faced with the constant risk of tunnel col-
lapse, exacerbated by the ubiquitous use of explosives. There is also a high
risk of pulmonary diseases and even suffocation, due to inadequate or non-
existent ventilation. In order to cope with this extremeworking environment,
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increasing numbers of the workers are turning to the use of metham-
phetamines (shabu), which makes the situation even more dangerous. Mean-
while processing labourers — and indeed the mining population at large
(Appleton et al., 1999) — face the consequences of constant exposure to
mercury and other hazardous chemicals. Living conditions outside the tun-
nels are hard, particularly for the massive migrant workforce that relies on
the financiers for subsistence. Foodstuffs are basic, often not more than rice
with canned sardines or dried fish, while accommodation in the ‘bunkhouse’
is often no more than a plastic sheet for cover, and rudimentary beds made
of rope. A final factor to consider is the high variability and unpredictabil-
ity of income due to the geological uncertainty of gold mining. While this
uncertainty is partly offset by the provision of subsistence needs and cash
advances by the financiers, which are widely seen as a token of goodwill,
most respondents agreed that these provisions also function as a form of debt
bondage, instilling a sense of loyalty and even obligation in the workforce
(Breman, 1999).
The Enabling Role of the State and Social Networks
In this final section I aim to demonstrate the role of the state and social net-
works in condoning, or even facilitating, accumulation through exploitation
of ASM. It is remarkable how PD 1899, promulgated by President Marcos
in 1984, captured the logic driving the informalization of mining, which
was in full swing at the time. Not only did it mention that a combination
of ‘inflation, volatile commodity prices, multiple increases of oil and fuel
prices, stringent environmental control measures and high cost of capital’
proved disastrous for large-scale mining, it also recognized explicitly that
the ‘abundance of cheap labor in the Philippines, relative flexibility and
simplicity of operations, minimum capital requirements . . . are among the
arguments that lend support to the development of small-scale mining’. Ul-
timately, PD 1899 put in place a minimalistic permit system that paid little
or no attention to the woes of the workforce. This minimalistic focus on
mineral tenure (and to a lesser extent on environmental regulation), to the
detriment of labour rights, was essentially upheld in subsequent regulatory
efforts, if not in formulation then at least in implementation. As noted ear-
lier, despite a clear stipulation in RA 7076 that ‘All persons undertaking
small-scale mining activities’ should register as members of an ASM coop-
erative, in practice this is a privilege reserved for a small stratum of ASM
operators. In the meantime, both the Marcos government and successive
democratic governments profited handsomely from ASM in the form of
beefed-up gold reserves, as the central bank retains the exclusive right to
buy ASM gold (Clad, 1988). Seen from this perspective, the government
can be included among the vested interests in the exploitation of informal
labour.
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The absence of formal labour regulation does not necessarily imply an
absence of regulation or even social protection as such, because ‘work and
well-being’ in the informal economy are often regulated by informal social
institutions (Harriss-White, 2010; Meagher, 1995). However, while several
respondents indeed suggested that ASM has ‘developed its own system of
social security’,18 these home-grown mechanisms are very limited in scope.
As one respondent succinctly but cynically summarized the financier’s obli-
gations: ‘The government is not watching over your shoulder. You do not
have to pay philhealth or SSS.19 If something happens to one of the miners,
you just pay the family a few thousands to buy their silence’.20 Furthermore,
while local miners can rely on local social networks, migrant miners often
lack such connections, and depend overwhelmingly on their financier-patron,
whose main concern is a cheap and reliable workforce. In this context, fi-
nanciers rely on a range of strategies that combine economic, political and
(the threat of) coercive power (Da Corta, 2011).21
There is another strategy that deserves brief mention, namely the role of
middlemen in recruiting and disciplining the workforce (Breman, 1999).
There are a number of these middlemen. Every corpo is headed by a team
leader, usually an experienced miner who commands the respect of the
other miners. His main tasks relate to organizing the underground mining
operations and monitoring the workforce, ensuring the unity of the corpo
and preventing workers from leaving.22 The team leader also acts as a key
gatekeeper for prospective labour recruits. Another key figure is the ‘runner’,
who supplies the mining operations and acts as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the
absentee financier in the area. In Compostela Valley, portal guards also play
a vital role in monitoring the workforce: like Chavez in the case of the APEX
operations mentioned above, they often have a reputation for violence, and
do not shy away from using (physical) force to discipline the workers. A
final, but essential, role is reserved for the landowner and his kin who, in
exchange for a share of royalties and priority access to labour opportunities
in high-grade tunnels, will monitor the area — and the workforce residing
in it — on behalf of the financier. In many areas, the authority and the
coercive capacity of local landowners is intimately intertwined with that of
the barangay, the lowest political-administrative unit in the Philippines.
18. Interview with anonymous respondent, Quezon City, March 2014.
19. Philhealth and the Social Security System are a national health insurance programme and a
semi-privatized social insurance programme, respectively, that require contributions from
employers.
20. Interview with anonymous respondent, Davao City, January 2014.
21. The previous section drew (cursory) attention to economic coercion, particularly the mech-
anism of debt, as an instrument to discipline the workforce.
22. Interview with team leader, Nabunturan, October 2012.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This article began by developing a critique of existing explanations for the
persistence of informality in ASM, which share a ‘legalistic’ focus on reg-
ulatory barriers and political impediments that prevent or discourage the
formalization of poverty-driven ASM operators through existing formal-
ization schemes. However, such explanations fail to fully account for the
situation in countries like the Philippines, where ASM is now characterized
by differentiation between a dominant stratum of ASM entrepreneurs and a
poverty-driven workforce. Even in cases where limited formalization efforts
provide ASMwith a degree of formal recognition, registration is reserved for
the dominant group of ASM entrepreneurs, while excluding the workforce
at large.
In an attempt to offer a more comprehensive explanation for the different
causes and consequences of informality for different segments of the ASM
sector, this article attempted to bridge the divide between the ASM liter-
ature and theoretical debates about informal sector activity. This led to an
integrative approach to analysing informality in ASM, which complements
a legalistic focus on entry barriers and exclusion with a structuralist con-
cern for the exploitation of informal labour. Applied to the Philippines, this
framework reveals that the massive expansion of predominantly informal
ASM can be understood as a process of informalization in the mining sector
as a whole, epitomized by a gradual transition from capital-intensive large-
scale mining to a regime of accumulation built around flexible ASM and the
exploitation of informal mining labour. Ultimately, these observations force
us to rethink the diverse origins and implications of informality in ASM.
While the existing literature projects an image of poor ASM operators that
remain excluded — whether deliberately or not (Hilson, 2013) — from the
formal economy, this article has also drawn attention to the vested interests
in the (partial) persistence of informality, in the form of a labour force that
is bereft of formal legal recognition and vulnerable to exploitation.
This more critical understanding of informality, which pays central an-
alytical attention to the position of the workforce in historical trajectories
of differentiation in ASM, can also inform a future research agenda. It
would, for example, be interesting to adopt a comparative perspective to
explore the extent to which the informalization angle can help shed light
on the expansion of ASM as a predominantly informal activity in countries
such as the DRC, where Rubbers (2006) has described a remarkably simi-
lar process of ‘informal privatization’ in Ge´camines, a mining company in
Katanga province. More generally, this article represents a new geograph-
ical exploration of sorts, as most of the ASM literature focuses selectively
on sub-Saharan Africa and (to a lesser extent) Latin America. There is an
urgent need for more (comparative) research on ASM in (Southeast) Asia,
which aims to understand how certain regional and national peculiarities
have impacted on the character and composition of ASM.
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The critical approach to informality in ASM proposed here may also help
shed new light on the relationship between ASM and large-scale mining. All
too often, this relationship is approached from a static, dualist perspective,
which assumes a strict distinction or even antagonism between informal
and rudimentary ASM activities and a modern, formal large-scale mining
sector (Canavesio, 2014). While many countries are indeed characterized
by the coexistence of large-scale mining and ASM, this article has set out
to illustrate that simplistic dualist images risk misinterpreting the hetero-
geneous and segmented character of the ASM sector, and the complexity
of its (historical) interaction with large-scale mining. Under the impetus of
rising mineral prices, the Philippines has seen a renewed interest on the part
of large-scale mining companies, who are now venturing into areas with a
significant ASM presence. While in some areas this is giving rise to con-
flict, a growing number of actors are now in support of working towards
a ‘win–win solution’. In the light of the analysis provided in this article, it
will be particularly interesting to find out how future relationships between
ASM and large-scale mining will affect the ASM workforce. The situation
in Tanzania provides some relevant, albeit discouraging, insights as the lib-
eralization of the mining sector and the associated expansion of medium-
and large-scale mining claims have had perverse effects on the position of
the workforce. On the one hand, many ASM claimants started selling their
claims to mining companies, rendering the position of those working inside
these claims highly uncertain (Fisher, 2007). On the other hand, instead of
simply displacing ASM and investing in more mechanized operations, many
of these companies capitalize on the presence of ASM, using their rights to
levy rents (Chachage, 1995).
Finally, the arguments put forward in this article can be read as an invita-
tion for policy makers to think of more inclusive approaches to formalizing
ASM, which aim to transcend the currently dominant and rather narrow fo-
cus onmineral tenure, by also considering strategies to recognize and protect
the interests of the massive workforce. Such an inclusive approach to for-
malization benefits tremendously from critical analysis that pays attention
not only to the shortcomings of existing formalization efforts, but also to the
position of the workforce in constantly changing regimes of accumulation
in the mining sector as a whole.
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